Real output costs of financial crises: A loss distribution approach
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Real Output Costs of Financial Crises: A Loss Distribution Approach∗
The adverse effects of financial crises in terms of output losses or output growth below its potential can be treated like losses from catastrophic events which have a low likelihood but a large impact in the event that they occur. We therefore analyze GDP losses in terms of frequency (number of loss events per period) and severity (loss per occurrence). Crises’ frequency, severity, and the ass...
متن کاملCapital Flows, Output Volatility, and Financial Crises in Emerging Markets
The surge in capital flows towards emerging market countries is one of the major developments in the world economy in the 1990s. In particular, short-term flows, in the form of portfolio investments or bank loans, have grown at an extremely rapid pace. At the same time, emerging markets have experienced an increasing number of financial crises, with dire consequences. It is increasingly argued ...
متن کاملFinancial Crises and Political Crises∗
The simultaneous determination of financial default and political crises is studied in an open economy model. Political crises accompany default in equilibrium because of an information transmission conflict between the government and the public. Multiple equilibria are possible: if foreign lenders are pessimistic about the country’s stability, they demand a high interest on the debt, exacerbat...
متن کاملEntropies of Negative Incomes, Pareto-Distributed Loss, and Financial Crises
Health monitoring of world economy is an important issue, especially in a time of profound economic difficulty world-wide. The most important aspect of health monitoring is to accurately predict economic downturns. To gain insights into how economic crises develop, we present two metrics, positive and negative income entropy and distribution analysis, to analyze the collective "spatial" and tem...
متن کاملAppendix to "Financial Crises and Political Crises"
PBE Type i: Neither default nor political crisis If V ≤ χL, the costs of default are always larger than the costs of servicing the debt even for the benevolent government. Then in equilibrium, the government proposes to service the debt, which is accepted by the representative agent. Hence the debt is repaid and political crisis is avoided. Neither the benevolent government nor the self interes...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Cuadernos de Economía
سال: 2014
ISSN: 0210-0266
DOI: 10.1016/j.cesjef.2012.12.001