Real earnings management and loan contract terms
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: The British Accounting Review
سال: 2019
ISSN: 0890-8389
DOI: 10.1016/j.bar.2019.03.002