Reaching Individually Stable Coalition Structures

The formal study of coalition formation in multi-agent systems is typically realized the framework hedonic games, which originate from economic theory. main focus this branch research has been on existence and computational complexity deciding structures that satisfy various stability criteria. actual process forming coalitions based individual behavior received little attention. In article, we convergence simple dynamics leading to stable partitions a variety established classes including anonymous, dichotomous, fractional, diversity games. consider stability: an agent will join another if she better off no member welcoming worse off. Our results are threefold. First, identify conditions for (fast) our dynamics. To end, develop new techniques simultaneous usage multiple intertwined potential functions establish reduction uncovering close relationship between anonymous games Second, provide elaborate counterexamples determining tight boundaries individually partitions. Third, problems related particular, settle open suggested by Bogomolnaia Jackson, Brandl et al., Boehmer Elkind.