Rationalizable partition-confirmed equilibrium

Rationalizable partition-confirmed equilibrium

Rationalizable partition-confirmed equilibrium (RPCE) describes the steady state outcomes of rational learning in extensive form games, when rationality is common knowledge and players observe a partition of the terminal nodes. RPCE allows players to make inferences about unobserved play by others; We discuss the implications of this using numerous examples, and discuss the relationship of RPCE...

Rationalizable Partition-Confirmed Equilibrium with Heterogeneous Beliefs

In many laboratory experiments, different subjects in the same player role have different beliefs and play differently. To explore the impact of these heterogeneous beliefs, along with the idea that subjects use their information about other players’ payoffs, we define rationalizable partition-confirmed equilibrium (RPCE). We provide several examples to highlight the impact of heterogeneous bel...

Online Supplementary Appendix to : Rationalizable Partition - Confirmed Equilibrium

Partition Equilibrium

We introduce partition equilibrium and study its existence in resource selection games (RSG). In partition equilibrium the agents are partitioned into coalitions, and only deviations by the prescribed coalitions are considered. This is in difference to the classical concept of strong equilibrium according to which any subset of the agents may deviate. In resource selection games, each agent sel...

Rationalizable Trade

“No-trade” theorems provide sufficient conditions for the absence of equilibrium trade between asymmetrically informed players.1 In this paper, we examine when trade is rationalizable. Since rationalizability is a weaker solution concept than equilibrium, trade is sometimes rationalizable, even when there is no equilibrium trade. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for rationalizable...