منابع مشابه
Price competition, Sequential Search and Sellers’ rationality
We consider a sequential search model with two types of consumers: (‘high cost’s) consumers who incur a positive search cost at each visit and informed consumers who visit all the firms at no cost. The objective is to compare Nash market predictions with a market with adaptive sellers using reinforcement learning. Simulation Results show that Reinforcement Learning never converges to Nash equil...
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When there is uncertainty about interest rates (typically due to either illiquidity or defaultability of zero coupon bonds) the cash-additivity assumption on risk measures becomes problematic. When this assumption is weakened, to cash-subadditivity for example, the equivalence between convexity and the diversi cation principle no longer holds. In fact, this principle only implies (and it is imp...
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I revisit the model of market competition with boundedly rational consumers due to Spiegler (2006), in which firms compete in price distributions and consumers use a naive sampling procedure to evaluate them. I assume that firms can assign weight to arbitrarily low prices, and consumers have a non-trivial ex ante outside option. In symmetric Nash equilibrium, firms charge a high ‘‘regular price...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics
سال: 1987
ISSN: 1074-0708,2056-7405
DOI: 10.1017/s008130520001743x