منابع مشابه
Collective rationality in bargaining
Roth (1977) axiomatized the Nash (1950) bargaining solution without Pareto optimality. His result is considered an improvement on Nash’s original one, since it dispenses with notions of collective rationality. Several variants of Roth’s result have been obtained in a line of subsequent works. However, all of them rely on Nash’s (1950) independence axiom. Whether or how collective rationality ca...
متن کاملIndividual rationality and bargaining
We argue that Nash’s solution to the bargaining problem should be modified such that it will be based on a New Reference Point (NRP). Such a point is needed so that a player is not considered ‘individually rational’ if he accepts an agreement that provides him with a utility lower than the minimal utility he can derive from any Pareto optimal agreement, or if he accepts an agreement that provid...
متن کاملRationality and solutions to nonconvex bargaining problems: Rationalizability and Nash solutions
Conditions α and β are two well-known rationality conditions in the theory of rational choice. This paper examines the implications of weaker versions of these two rationality conditions in the context of solutions to nonconvex bargaining problems. It is shown that, together with the standard axioms of efficiency and strict individual rationality, they imply rationalizability of solutions to no...
متن کاملReputational Bargaining with Minimal Knowledge of Rationality∗
Two players announce bargaining postures to which they may become committed and then bargain over the division of a surplus. The share of the surplus that a player can guarantee herself under first-order knowledge of rationality is determined (as a function of her probability of becoming committed), as is the bargaining posture that she must announce in order to guarantee herself this much. Thi...
متن کاملReputational Bargaining under Knowledge of Rationality
Two players announce bargaining postures to which they may become committed and then bargain over the division of a surplus. The share of the surplus that a player can guarantee herself under rst-order knowledge of rationality is determined (as a function of her probability of becoming committed), as is the bargaining posture that she must announce in order to guarantee herself this much. This...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Mathematical Economics
سال: 2000
ISSN: 0304-4068
DOI: 10.1016/s0304-4068(99)00033-6