RATIONALITY IN PROBABILITY JUDGMENT

Kant on the Rationality of Moral Judgment

Judgment aggregation without full rationality

Several recent results on the aggregation of judgments over logically connected propositions show that, under certain conditions, dictatorships are the only propositionwise aggregation functions generating fully rational (i.e., complete and consistent) collective judgments. A frequently mentioned route to avoid dictatorships is to allow incomplete collective judgments. We show that this route d...

kant on the rationality of moral judgment

the paper deals with kant's conception of moral judgment. i start by criticizing a dominant interpretation of kant's practical rationality in its assertion that choosing, i.e. exercising judgment consists in adopting a maxim; and adopting a maxim is equivalent to acting on a principle, giving oneself the moral law (korsgaard). according to this view, the logical inescapability of choo...

Noisy probability judgment, the conjunction fallacy, and rationality: Comment on Costello and Watts (2014).

According to Costello and Watts (2014), probability theory can account for key findings in human judgment research provided that random noise is embedded in the model. We concur with a number of Costello and Watts's remarks, but challenge the empirical adequacy of their model in one of their key illustrations (the conjunction fallacy) on the basis of recent experimental findings. We also discus...

Probability Judgment in Artificial Intelligence

This paper is concerned with two theories of probability judgment: the Bayesian theory and the theory of belief functions. It illustrates these theories with some simple examples and discusses some of the issues that arise when we try to implement them in expert systems. The Bayesian theory is well known; its main ideas go back to the work of Thomas Bayes (1702-1761). The theory of belief funct...