Rational inefficient compromises in negotiation
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Rational Inefficient Compromises in Negotiation
Korhonen, Phillips, Teich and Wallenius (1998), in their letter to the Editor, observe with some dismay that people are often not willing to improve the compromises they have achieved through negotiations and provide some possible explanations and remedies. In this note we attempt to address several of the concerns raised in the letter and point the reader to relevant literature. Acceptance of ...
متن کاملRational agents, contract curves, and inefficient compromises
Several studies of two-party negotiations have shown that negotiators more often than not reach inefficient compromises. We analyze the circumstances under which rational agents make inefficient compromises and refrain from improving them. We do this by describing and interpreting various negotiation situations and by developing formal constructs and theorems for determining the character of a ...
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Several studies of two-party negotiations have shown that negotiators more often than not reach inefficient compromises. We analyze the circumstances under which rational agents make inefficient compromises and refrain from improving them. We do this by describing and interpreting various negotiation situations and by developing formal constructs and theorems for determining the character of a ...
متن کاملNegotiating Inefficient Compromises: Is Less Better than More?
INSPIRE, a web-based negotiation support system has been used to obtain data about cross-cultural anonymous negotiations. One of the feature of the system is its verification of the agreement efficiency. In this paper we discuss some of the possible reasons for negotiators to accept inefficient compromises.
متن کاملA Praxeology for Rational Negotiation
Multi-agent artificial decision systems require a praxeology, or science of efficient action, that accommodates complex interactions between decision makers. Conventional praxeologies are built on the paradigm of rational choice, which comprises the two companion premises of totally-ordered preferences and individual rationality. Exclusive self-interest when negotiating, however, engenders a pe...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Multi-Criteria Decision Analysis
سال: 1999
ISSN: 1057-9214,1099-1360
DOI: 10.1002/(sici)1099-1360(199903)8:2<106::aid-mcda243>3.0.co;2-7