Rational expectations and farsighted stability
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Rational expectations and farsighted stability
In the study of farsighted coalitional behavior, a central role is played by the von Neumann-Morgenstern (1944) stable set and its modification that incorporates farsightedness. Such a modification was first proposed by Harsanyi (1974) and has recently been re-formulated by Ray and Vohra (2015). The farsighted stable set is based on a notion of indirect dominance in which an outcome can be domi...
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Farsighted game theoretic solution concepts have been shown to provide insightful results in many applications. However, we provide simple examples demonstrating that the existing solution concepts may fail to incorporate some important aspects of farsighted reasoning. This failure stems apparently from the reliance of these concepts on constructs such as indirect dominance which only provide l...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Theoretical Economics
سال: 2017
ISSN: 1933-6837
DOI: 10.3982/te2454