منابع مشابه
Rational Expectations in Games
Modern game theory was born in 1928, when John von Neumann published his Minimax Theorem. Inter alia, this theorem ascribes to all two-person zero-sum games a value—what rational players should expect to get. Almost 80 years later, strategic game theory has not gotten beyond that initial point, insofar as the basic question of value is concerned. To be sure, we do have equilibrium theories: the...
متن کاملA Simple Test of Rational Expectations
Do We Follow Others When We Should? A Simple Test of Rational Expectations The paper presents a new meta data set covering 13 experiments on the social learning games by Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch (1992). The large amount of data makes it possible to estimate the empirically optimal action for a large variety of decision situations and ask about the economic significance of suboptimal...
متن کاملLearning Within Rational-Expectations Equilibrium
Models of macroeconomic learning are populated by agents who possess a great deal of knowledge of the “true” structure of the economy, and yet ignore the impact of their own learning on that structure; they may learn about an equilibrium, but they do not learn within it. An alternative learning model is presented where agents’ decisions are informed by hypotheses they hold regarding the economy...
متن کاملAmbiguity and rational expectations equilibria∗
This paper proves the existence and robustness of partially-revealing rational expectations equilibria (REE) when this equilibrium concept is expanded to allow for some agents to have preferences that display ambiguity aversion. Furthermore, the generic existence of fullyrevealing REE is proven for a commonly-used subset of the class of ambiguity averse preferences. This finding illustrates tha...
متن کاملBoundedly versus Procedurally Rational Expectations
Economists who have relied on the rational expectations hypothesis are now seeking to demonstrate that rational expectiations equilibria can emerge in models with agents who are artificually intelligent. Agents’ intelligence is represented by genetic algorithms. However, these algorithms misrepresent current understanding of human cognition as well as well known and long standing evidence from ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Brookings Papers on Economic Activity
سال: 1973
ISSN: 0007-2303
DOI: 10.2307/2534209