Rational Exaggeration in Information Aggregation Games
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Rational Exaggeration in Information Aggregation Games
This paper studies a class of decision-making problems under incomplete information which we call “aggregation games.” It departs from the mainstream information aggregation literature in two respects: information is aggregated by averaging rather than majority rule, and each player selects from a continuum of reports rather than making a binary choice. Each member of a group receives a private...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2008
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1279601