Rational Choice or Deliberation? Customary International Law between Coordination and Constitutionalization

A State Preferences Account of Customary International Law Adjudication

The standard account today of customary international law (CIL) is that it arises from the widespread and consistent practice of states followed out of a sense of legal obligation. Although commonly recited, this account is plagued by evidentiary, normative, and conceptual difficulties, and it has been subjected to increasing criticism in recent years. This paper posits a different account of C...

Rational Choice, Behavioral Economics, and the Law

Jolls, Sunstein, and Thaler wish to use the insights of behavioral economics to improve economic analysis of law, which they believe to be handicapped by its commitment to the assumption that people are rational.1 The editors of the Review have asked me to comment on JST's paper, no doubt because of my identification with rational-choice economics. Since JST complain with some justice that econ...

The Formation of Customary Law

Hyper-Rational Choice and Economic Behaviour

In this paper, with help of the concept of hyper-rationality, we model the interaction between two investment companies by an important game as trickery game that has special equilibrium which called hyper-equilibrium. In trickery game, one company can choose cooperation with another company until the last moment and finally changes his action to non-cooperation which incur more loss to an oppo...

Islamic Law , Customary Law , and Afghan Informal Justice

This report is part of the United States Institute of Peace’s (USIP) ongoing effort to understand the pluralist legal system of Afghanistan. It examines, compares, and contrasts Islamic law with traditional forms of justice in an attempt to elucidate how such rule of law approaches interact as well as provide a fuller understanding of each system to better guide rule of law practice, policy, an...