منابع مشابه
Digitized by the Internet Archive in 2011 with Funding from Working Paper Department of Economics Rational Behavior with Payoff Uncertainty Number 471
The iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies has been advanced as a necessary requirement for 'rational' play. However, this requirement relies on the assumption that the players have no doubts about their opponents payoffs. We show that once such doubts are introduced, all that can be justified by an appeal to rationality is one round of deletion of weakly dominated strategies, followe...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Economic Theory
سال: 1990
ISSN: 0022-0531
DOI: 10.1016/0022-0531(90)90033-g