Ratewise-optimal non-sequential search strategies under constraints on the tests
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Ratewise-optimal non-sequential search strategies under constraints on the tests
Already in his Lectures on Search Renyi suggested to consider a search problem, where an unknown x ∈ X = {1, 2, . . . , n} is to be found by asking for containment in a minimal number m(n, k) of subsets A1, . . . , Am with the restrictions |Ai| ≤ k < n2 for i = 1, 2, . . . ,m. Katona gave in 1966 the lower bound m(n, k) ≥ log n h( k n) in terms of binary entropy and the upper bound m(n, k) ≤ ⌈
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Discrete Applied Mathematics
سال: 2008
ISSN: 0166-218X
DOI: 10.1016/j.dam.2006.06.013