Range convexity and ambiguity averse preferences
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Range convexity and ambiguity averse preferences
We show that range convexity of beliefs, a ‘technical’ condition that appears naturally in axiomatizations of preferences in a Savage-like framework, imposes some unexpected restrictions when modelling ambiguity averse preferences. That is, when it is added to a mild condition, range convexity makes the preferences collapse to subjective expected utility as soon as they satisfy structural condi...
متن کاملDivision of the Humanities and Social Sciences California Institute of Technology Pasadena, California 91125 Range Convexity and Ambiguity Averse Preferences
We show that range convexity of beliefs, a ‘technical’ condition that appears naturally in axiomatizations of preferences in a Savage-like framework, imposes some unexpected restrictions when modelling ambiguity averse preferences. That is, when it is added to a mild condition, range convexity makes the preferences collapse to subjective expected utility as soon as they satisfy structural condi...
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We consider the impact of anticipatory feelings on behavior. We focus on a very simple type of anticipatory feelings: we assume that anticipatory feelings are based on future expected utility. Although this modeling may not reflect the complexity of anticipatory emotions, it has an interesting consequence: We show that when there are diminishing returns in anticipatory feelings and additive sep...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Economic Theory
سال: 2001
ISSN: 0938-2259
DOI: 10.1007/pl00004118