منابع مشابه
Randomization with Asymmetric Information
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متن کاملKnowledge State Algorithms: Randomization with Limited Information
We introduce the concept of knowledge states; many well-known algorithms can be viewed as knowledge state algorithms. The knowledge state approach can be used to to construct competitive randomized online algorithms and study the tradeo between competitiveness and memory. A knowledge state simply states conditional obligations of an adversary, by xing a work function, and gives a distribution f...
متن کاملCompetitive Equilibria with Asymmetric Information
This paper studies competitive equilibria in economies where agents trade in markets for standardized, non-exclusive financial contracts, under conditions of asymmetric information (both of the moral hazard and the adverse selection type). The problems for the existence of competitive equilibria in this framework are identified, and shown to be essentially the same under different forms of asym...
متن کاملInformation Gatekeeper with Asymmetric Firms
Asymmetry exists among the firms selling homogeneous product in online market. This paper provides a theoretical study on the equilibrium behavior of the firms and the information gatekeeper in a duopoly market with asymmetric sizes of loyal consumers. In equilibrium, the firm with larger number of loyal consumers tends to advertise less frequently but charges a lower average price whenever adv...
متن کاملCore convergence with asymmetric information
We analyze the ex ante incentive compatible core for replicated private information economies. We show that any allocation in the core when the economy is replicated sufficiently often is approximately Walrasian for the associated Arrow–Debreu economy. 2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. JEL classification: C7; C71; D5
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: The RAND Journal of Economics
سال: 1988
ISSN: 0741-6261
DOI: 10.2307/2555661