منابع مشابه
Approval voting in subset elections
Approval voting is designed to be "insensitive to numbers" of voters, and likely to elect a Condorcet candidate. However, the result of an election among one group of candidates gives no information about the results of elections among any other groups, even if every voter follows the recommended utilitymaximizing strategy, which places strong restrictions on the individual voter's subset ballo...
متن کاملSubset Selection via Implicit Utilitarian Voting
How should one aggregate ordinal preferences expressed by voters into a measurably superior social choice? A well-established approach — which we refer to as implicit utilitarian voting — assumes that voters have latent utility functions that induce the reported rankings, and seeks voting rules that approximately maximize utilitarian social welfare. We extend this approach to the design of rule...
متن کاملRandom Subset Optimization
Some of the most successful algorithms for satisfiability, such as Walksat, are based on random walks. Similarly, local search algorithms for solving constraint optimization problems benefit significantly from randomization. However, well-known algorithms such as stochastic search or simulated annealing perform a less directed random walk than used in satisfiability. By making a closer analogy ...
متن کاملMultiple Random Subset-Kernel Learning
In this paper, the multiple random subset-kernel learning (MRSKL) algorithm is proposed. In MRSKL, a subset of training samples is randomly selected for each kernel with randomly set parameters, and the kernels with optimal weights are combined for classification. A linear support vector machine (SVM) is adopted to determine the optimal kernel weights; therefore, MRSKL is based on a hierarchica...
متن کاملRandom Walks and Voting Theory
Voters preferences depend on the available information. Following Case-Based Decision Theory, we assume that this information is processed additively. We prove that the collective preferences deduced from the individual ones through majority vote cannot be arbitrary, as soon as a winning quota is required. The proof is based on a new result on random walks. ∗Département Finance et Economie, HE...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation
سال: 2018
ISSN: 1460-7425
DOI: 10.18564/jasss.3610