Random payoff games with partial information : one person games against nature
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Mean-payoff games with partial-observation
Mean-payoff games are important quantitative models for open reactive systems. They have been widely studied as games of perfect information. In this paper we investigate the algorithmic properties of several subclasses of meanpayoff games where the players have asymmetric information about the state of the game. These games are in general undecidable and not determined according to the classic...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Revue française d'informatique et de recherche opérationnelle. Série verte
سال: 1971
ISSN: 0376-2165
DOI: 10.1051/ro/197105v300031