Random Matching Under Dichotomous Preferences
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Multilateral Matching Under Dichotomous Preferences
For any multilateral matching problem with dichotomous preferences, in the sense that agents are indifferent between all acceptable teams, there exist some strategy proof, individually rational and efficient mechanisms. Moreover some random matching mechanisms simultaneously satisfy the three crucial desiderata of mechanism design: efficiency, fairness and strategyproofness, which typically con...
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• Page 17, line 13: “constrast” −→ “contrast”. (Due to Mechthild Opperud.) • Page 21, line 17: “attributes” −→ “attributed”. • Page 21, lines -4 to -3: change “pairs in which either (i) ri is unassigned if she is unassigned in both M and M ′, or (ii)” to “pairs obtained as follows: for each resident ri, ri is unassigned if she is unassigned in both M and M ′, otherwise”. • Page 21, line -1: “jo...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Econometrica
سال: 2004
ISSN: 0012-9682,1468-0262
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0262.2004.00483.x