Quota Bonuses as Localized Sales Bonuses
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Dopamine Bonuses
Substantial data support a temporal difference (TO) model of dopamine (OA) neuron activity in which the cells provide a global error signal for reinforcement learning. However, in certain circumstances, OA activity seems anomalous under the TO model, responding to non-rewarding stimuli. We address these anomalies by suggesting that OA cells multiplex information about reward bonuses, including ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Managerial and Decision Economics
سال: 2017
ISSN: 0143-6570
DOI: 10.1002/mde.2837