QUIT BEHAVIOR UNDER IMPERFECT INFORMATION: SEARCHING, MOVING, LEARNING
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Observational learning under imperfect information
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Economic Inquiry
سال: 1985
ISSN: 0095-2583,1465-7295
DOI: 10.1111/j.1465-7295.1985.tb01774.x