Quid pro quo: Friendly information exchange between rivals
نویسندگان
چکیده
We show that information exchange via disclosure is possible in equilibrium even when it certain whenever one party learns the truth, other loses. The incentive to disclose results either from an expectation of being reciprocated—the quid pro quo motive—or possibility learning rival's failure act response a disclosure—the screening motive. Alternating and gradual disclosures are generally indispensable for number rounds grows without bound if agents' initial becomes sufficiently diffuse; sense, less informed agents are, more they talk. Patient individuals can achieve efficiency by means continuous alternating limited amounts information. This provides rationale protracted dialogues.
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Theoretical Economics
سال: 2022
ISSN: ['1555-7561', '1933-6837']
DOI: https://doi.org/10.3982/te4643