Quarrelling and Protesting: How Organizers Shape a Demonstration

Organizers

Program Committee Liz Bradley (University of Colorado, Boulder, USA) Gully Burns (USC Information Sciences Institute, USA) Ishanu Chattopadhyay (Cornell University, USA) Tim Clark (Harvard University, USA) Anita de Waard (Elsevier) Michel Dumontier (Stanford University, USA) Saso Dzeroski (Jozef Stefan Institute, Slovenia) Susan Epstein (e CUNY Graduate School and Hunter College, USA) Ashok Go...

Organizers

Program Committee John Collins (University of Minnesota, USA) Shaheen Fatima (University of Loughborough, UK) Enrico Gerding (University of Southampton, UK) Maria Gini (University of Minnesota, USA) Amy Greenwald (Brown University, USA) Gordan Jezic (University of Zagreb, Croatia) Patrick R. Jordan (Microso, USA) Wolf Ketter (RSM Erasmus University, Netherlands) Christopher Kiekintveld (Univer...

Organizers

Strategic power indices: Quarrelling in coalitions∗

While they use the language of game theory known measures of a priory voting power are hardly more than statistical expectations assuming voters behave randomly. Focusing on normalised indices we show that rational players would behave differently from the indices predictions and propose a model that captures such strategic behaviour.

Organizers and Sponsors