Quantity leadership and social inefficiency
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Quantity leadership and social inefficiency
A game of simultaneous free entry and sequential output choices is analyzed. Firms enter simultaneously in stage 1 by paying a fixed cost, and they choose output levels sequentially in subsequent stages. At the subgame-perfect equilibrium of the game, the production level of a firm is decreasing with the order of the firm in the decision-making. The firm that is the last to choose output produc...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: International Journal of Industrial Organization
سال: 1993
ISSN: 0167-7187
DOI: 10.1016/0167-7187(93)90005-w