Quality Management by Warranty Contract Under Dual Asymmetric Information
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Competitive Price and Quality under Asymmetric Information
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management
سال: 2020
ISSN: 0018-9391,1558-0040
DOI: 10.1109/tem.2020.2972563