منابع مشابه
Quality Disclosure and Competition
We analyze costly quality disclosure with horizontally differentiated products under duopoly and monopoly, and characterize the effect of competition on disclosure and welfare. We show that expected disclosure is higher under monopoly than under duopoly, and the welfare comparison depends on the level of disclosure cost: when the disclosure cost is low, welfare is higher under monopoly than duo...
متن کاملCompetition, Disclosure and Signalling*
Competition creates strategic incentives for firms to communicate private information about product quality through signalling rather than voluntary disclosure. In a duopoly where firms may disclose quality before setting prices and prices may signal quality, non-disclosure by all firms may often be the unique symmetric outcome even if disclosure cost vanishes. A high-quality firm may not discl...
متن کاملMedia competition and information disclosure
Acknowledgments This paper is based on Chap. 2 of my Ph.D. thesis completed at Universidad de Alicante under the helpful supervision of Javier M. López-Cuñat.A previous version of this paper circulated with the title “Asymmetric information and Election campaigns: the monitoring role of media” (IVIE WP-AD 2004-32). I thank EnriquetaAragonés, TimothyBesley,MatthiasDahm,DanielDiermeier,RamónFaulí...
متن کاملCompetition in Information Disclosure
We analyze a model of competition in Bayesian persuasion in which two or more senders vie for the patronage of a receiver by disclosing information about their respective proposal qualities. The model’s primitives that define the competitive environment are: the ex-ante correlation of senders’ proposal qualities; the respective ex-ante expected proposal qualities; and the number of competing se...
متن کاملTrade Disclosure and Imperfect Competition among Insiders
We analyze how public disclosure of insiders' trades a ects competition among informed insiders in a dynamic Kyle model. Under disclosure requirement, an insider's order ow consists of two components: an information-based component for a pro t and a random component for hiding information. We show that insiders trade more aggressively on their private information and the random components from ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: The Journal of Industrial Economics
سال: 2009
ISSN: 0022-1821
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-6451.2009.00366.x