Putting the ‘Experiment’ back into the ‘Thought Experiment’
نویسندگان
چکیده
Abstract Philosophers have debated at length the epistemological status of scientific thought experiments. I contend that literature on this topic still lacks a common conceptual framework, lacuna produces radical disagreement among participants in debate. To remedy problem, suggest focusing distinction between internal and external validity an experiment, which is also crucial for then develop account both kinds context show we can naturally conceptualise terms games make-believe. Then, argue best defined as accurate representation target system. Finally, turn back to current debate experiments my diarchic provides general framework be shared by competing philosophical views, well fruitful guide their reconciliation.
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Synthese
سال: 2023
ISSN: ['0039-7857', '1573-0964']
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-022-04011-3