Putnam, Koethe, and Metaphysical Realism

Metaphysical Realism and Thought

In this paper I identify some unexplored implications of content externalism. The implications can be traced to the role that metaphysical realism plays in some of the standard arguments for content externalism. I do not regard these implications as undermining the case for externalism. I identify them, rather, as part of an attempt at honest accounting: the revisionary nature of content extern...

Conceptual Relativity and Metaphysical Realism

Is conceptual relativity a genuine phenomenon? If so, how is it properly understood? And if it does occur, does it undermine metaphysical realism? These are the questions we propose to address. We will argue that conceptual relativity is indeed a genuine phenomenon, albeit an extremely puzzling one. We will offer an account of it. And we will argue that it is entirely compatible with metaphysic...

Putnam's Paradox: Metaphysical Realism Revamped and Evaded*

Hilary Putnam's argument against metaphysical realism (commonly referred to as the "model theoretic argument") has now enjoyed two decades of discussion. 1 The text is rich and contains variously construable arguments against variously construed philosophical positions. David Lewis isolated one argument and called it "Putnam's Paradox".2 That argument is clear and concise; so is the paradoxical...

Consequentialism, Metaphysical Realism, and the Argument from Clueless- ness†

The most powerful version of the classic epistemic argument against consequentialism is stated in an article by James Lenman. Lenman’s “argument from cluelessness” claims that a significant percentage of the consequences of our actions are wholly unknowable and hence, when it comes to assessing the moral quality of our actions, we are literally without a clue. In this paper, I distinguish the a...

Earning the Right Means Paying the Costs: Metaphysical Problems for Quasi-Realism