Pushing the Intuitions behind Moral Internalism
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
7 Moral Intuitions
moral judgments (see Greene et al., 2001, 2004, 2008; Cushman et al., 2006 proposes a similar view). This dichotomy in moral judgments seems analogous to subjects’ tendency to say that the baseline is crucial to probability when asked abstractly but then to overlook baseline percentages and focus solely on representativeness when asked to make a probability judgment in a concrete case. A correl...
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There is an ongoing debate among psychologists regarding the psychological factors underlying moral judgments. Rationalists argue that informational assumptions (i.e. ideological beliefs about how the world works) play a causal role in shaping moral judgments whereas intuitionists argue that informational assumptions are post hoc justifications for judgments made automatically by innate intuiti...
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Against moral intuitionism, which holds that moral intuitions can be non-inferentially justified, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong argues that moral intuitions are unreliable and must be confirmed to be justified (i.e. must be justified inferentially) because they are subject to cognitive biases. However, I suggest this is merely a renewed version of the argument from disagreement against intuitionism....
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The social intuitionist model (J. Haidt, 2001) posits that fast and automatic intuitions are the primary source of moral judgments. Conscious deliberations play little causal role; they are used mostly to construct post hoc justifications for judgments that have already occurred. In this article, the authors present evidence that fast and automatic moral intuitions are actually shaped and infor...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Philosophical Psychology
سال: 2014
ISSN: 0951-5089,1465-394X
DOI: 10.1080/09515089.2013.867584