Purification in the infinitely-repeated prisoners' dilemma
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma∗
This paper investigates the Harsanyi (1973)-purifiability of mixed strategies in the repeated prisoners’ dilemma with perfect monitoring. We perturb the game so that in each period, a player receives a private payoff shock which is independently and identically distributed across players and periods. We focus on the purifiability of one-period memory mixed strategy equilibria used by Ely and Vä...
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In the context of an infinitely repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma, we explore how cooperation is initiated when players communicate and coordinate through their actions. There are two types of players patient and impatient which are private information. An impatient type is incapable of cooperative play, while if both players are patient types and this is common knowledge then they can cooperate with...
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In the context of an infinitely repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma, we explore how cooperation is initiated when players signal and coordinate through their actions. There are two types of players patient and impatient and a player’s type is private information. An impatient type is incapable of cooperative play, while if both players are patient types and this is common knowledge then they can cooper...
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We describe the maximum efficient subgame perfect equilibrium payoff for a player in the repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma, as a function of the discount factor. For discount factors above a critical level, every efficient, feasible, individually rational payoff profile can be sustained. For an open and dense subset of discount factors below the critical value, the maximum efficient payoff is not an ...
متن کاملRational Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma
A common observation in experiments involving finite repetition of the prisoners’ dilemma is that players do not always play the single-period dominant strategies (“finking”), but instead achieve some measure of cooperation. Yet finking at each stage is the only Nash equilibrium in the finitely repeated game. We show here how incomplete information about one or both players’ options, motivation...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Review of Economic Dynamics
سال: 2008
ISSN: 1094-2025
DOI: 10.1016/j.red.2007.10.004