Pure strategy equilibria in symmetric two-player zero-sum games
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Pure strategy equilibria in symmetric two-player zero-sum games
We show that a symmetric two-player zero-sum game has a pure strategy equilibrium if and only if it is not a generalized rock-paper-scissors matrix. Moreover, we show that every finite symmetric quasiconcave two-player zero-sum game has a pure equilibrium. Further sufficient conditions for existence are provided. We point out that the class of symmetric two-player zero-sum games coincides with ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: International Journal of Game Theory
سال: 2011
ISSN: 0020-7276,1432-1270
DOI: 10.1007/s00182-011-0302-x