Pure Strategy Asymmetric Rendezvous on the Line with an Unknown Initial Distance
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Symmetric Linear Rendezvous with an Unknown Initial Distance
In the rendezvous problem, two robots at unknown locations must successfully meet somewhere in the environment. In the asymmetric formulation, the robots may execute different strategies. We study the symmetric version of the problem, in which they must use the same strategy. We provide a new algorithm for the symmetric rendezvous problem on the line. Our symmetric strategy has a competitive ra...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Operations Research
سال: 2000
ISSN: 0030-364X,1526-5463
DOI: 10.1287/opre.48.3.498.12432