Pure Nash equilibria of competitive diffusion process on toroidal grid graphs
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Games on Graphs The Complexity of Pure Nash Equilibria
In this thesis, we analyze the problem of computing pure Nash equilibria in succinctly representable games, with a focus on graphical and action-graph games. While the problem is NP-Complete for both models, it is known to be polynomial time computable when restricted to games of bounded treewidth. We propose a dynamic programming approach for computing pure Nash equilibria of graphical games. ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Discrete Applied Mathematics
سال: 2016
ISSN: 0166-218X
DOI: 10.1016/j.dam.2016.07.021