Pure Equilibrium Strategies in Multi-Unit Auctions with Private Value Bidders
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Equilibrium strategies for multi-unit sealed-bid auctions with multi-unit demand bidders
In most of the existing literature on multi-unit auctions, i.e. auctions selling several identical goods together, it is assumed that bidders demand a single item. Yet this assumption is not valid in most practical auction settings, as often bidders wish to purchase multiple goods. Computing equilibrium strategies in multi-unit uniform-price auctions for bidders with multi-unit demand is an ope...
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Abstract This paper studies discriminatory and uniform price auctions, the two most common “multi-unit auctions” for selling multiple identical objects. In such auctions, the distribution of bidder values is only partially identified from the distribution of bids. Given (asymmetric unobserved) correlated private values, sufficient conditions are provided for a given bid distribution to be ratio...
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Existing work on auctions assumes that bidders are symmetric in their types — they have the same risk attitude and their valuations are drawn from the same distribution. This is unrealistic in many real-world applications, where highly heterogeneous bidders with different risk attitudes and widely varying valuation distributions commonly compete with each other. Using computational service auct...
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Prior-free auctions are robust auctions that assume no distribution over bidders’ valuations and provide worst-case (input-by-input) approximation guarantees. In contrast to previous work on this topic, we pursue good prior-free auctions with non-identical bidders. Prior-free auctions can approximate meaningful benchmarks for non-identical bidders only when sufficient qualitative information ab...
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This paper considers a first price common value auction with one-sided private information among bidders. An object is rented each period to the highest bidder without revealing the bids made in previous periods. The paper extends single crossing arguments used in static games to show the existence of equilibrium in this repeated auction. The model predicts that bidders bid more aggressively in...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2008
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1483179