Punishment and Cooperation in Stochastic Social Dilemmas
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Punishment and Cooperation in Stochastic Social Dilemmas
Previous findings on punishment have focused on environments in which the outcomes are known with certainty. In this paper, we conduct experiments to investigate how punishment affects cooperation in a two-person stochastic prisoner’s dilemma environment where each person can decide whether or not to cooperate and the outcomes of alternative strategies are specified probabilistically. In partic...
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Many social dilemmas exhibit nonlinearities and equilibrium outcomes in the interior of the choice space. This paper reports a laboratory experiment studying whether peer punishment promotes socially efficient behavior in such environments, which have been ignored in most experimental studies of peer punishment. It compares the effectiveness of peer punishment in a linear public good game to th...
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From the vast amount of research on the public goods game experiment, it became a shared wisdom that a costly punishment of one to others is an effective mechanism to reduce free riders.1 In earlier works of Yamagishi (1986, 1988), a Novel prized work of Ostrom, Walker and Gardner (1992), and seminal works of Fehr and Gächter (2000, 2002), a drastic increase in the average contribution to the p...
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The effect of sanctions on cooperation depends on social and cultural norms. While free riding is kept at bay by altruistic punishment in certain cultures, antisocial punishment carried out by free riders pushes back cooperation in others. In this paper we analyze sanctions in both a standard public goods game with a linear production function and an otherwise identical social dilemma in which ...
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Direct reciprocity and conditional cooperation are important mechanisms to prevent free riding in social dilemmas. However, in large groups, these mechanisms may become ineffective because they require single individuals to have a substantial influence on their peers. However, the recent discovery of zero-determinant strategies in the iterated prisoner's dilemma suggests that we may have undere...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Conflict Resolution
سال: 2015
ISSN: 0022-0027,1552-8766
DOI: 10.1177/0022002714564426