Punishing personal and electoral corruption: Experimental evidence from India

Social Capital and Corruption: Theory, and Evidence from India∗

Potential bribe-payers often face a collective action problem: they would all be better off if they could enforce an agreement not to pay bribes. This paper uses a linkedgames model to show how social capital, viewed as trust generated through repeated interactions in other games, can help them to overcome this collective action problem and enforce agreements (or norms) against bribery. We also...

Corruption as Betrayal : Experimental Evidence on Corruption Under Delegation

We consider corruption behavior in a three-players game : Principal, Agent, Corrupter. When the Principal chooses a fair wage, the Agent faces conflicting interests to reciprocate. This delegation effect is expected to lower the level of corruption as compared to what arises in two-players settings. We set up two experiments varying in the exogeneity of the delegation relationship. The experime...

Political motivations and electoral competition: Equilibrium analysis and experimental evidence

We study both theoretically and experimentally the set of Nash equilibria of a classical one-dimensional election game with two candidates. These candidates are interested in power and ideology, but their weights on these two motives are not necessarily identical. Apart from obtaining the well known median voter result and the two-sided policy differentiation outcome, the paper uncovers the exi...

Electoral Goals and Center-State Transfers: Theoretical Model and Empirical Evidence from India

Electoral Goals and Center-State Transfers: A Theoretical Model and Empirical Evidence from India We construct a model of redistributive politics where the central government is opportunistic and uses its discretion to make transfers to state governments on the basis of political considerations. These considerations are the alignment between the incumbent parties at the central and state levels...

Experimental Evidence about Whether (and Why) Electoral Closeness Affects Turnout