Public Goods, Social Norms, and Naïve Beliefs
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Public Goods , Social Norms and Naive Beliefs ∗
An individual’s contribution to a public good may be seen by others as a signal of attributes such as generosity or wealth. An individual may, therefore, choose their contribution so as to send an appropriate signal to others. In this paper we question how the inferences made by others will influence the amount contributed to the public good. Evidence suggests that individuals are naive and bia...
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Understanding the causal impact of beliefs on contributions in Threshold Public Goods (TPGs) is particularly important since the social optimum can be supported as a Nash Equilibrium and best-response contributions are a function of beliefs. Unfortunately, investigations of the impact of beliefs on behavior are plagued with endogeneity concerns. We create a set of instruments by cleanly and exo...
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We study a linear public goods game using an inter-generational approach. Subjects in one generation leave advice for the succeeding generation via free-form messages. Such advice can be private knowledge (advice left by one player in generation t is given only to his or her immediate successor in generation t +1), public knowledge (advice left by players of generation t is made available to al...
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This paper identifies gender beliefs in a public goods game and studies their impact on cooperation. On average, the beliefs of men, but not those of women, depend significantly on the group gender composition, with men expecting groups to be more cooperative when more females are present in the group. Gender beliefs of women are not absent, however, but show more variance than those of men. Th...
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The optimal provision of a state-variable public good, where the global climate is the prime example, is analyzed in a model where people care about their relative consumption. We consider both keeping-up-with-the-Joneses preferences (where people compare their own current consumption with others’ current consumption) and catching-up-withthe-Joneses preferences (where people compare their own c...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Public Economic Theory
سال: 2010
ISSN: 1097-3923,1467-9779
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9779.2009.01457.x