Public goods games and psychological utility: Theory and evidence
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Public Goods Games
Centralized sanctioning institutions are of utmost importance for overcoming free-riding tendencies and enforcing outcomes that maximize group welfare in social dilemma situations. However, little is known about how such institutions come into existence. In this paper we investigate, both theoretically and experimentally, the endogenous formation of institutions in a public goods game. Our theo...
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We reconsider the well known Becker-Coase (BC ) argument, according to which changes in divorce laws should not affect divorce rates, in the context of households which consume public goods in addition to private goods. For this result to hold, utility must be transferable both within marriage and upon divorce, and the marginal rate of substitution between public and private consumption needs t...
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This paper studies, both theoretically and experimentally, frame effects in the context of a public good game in which players have to make a costly contribution either i) to achieve or ii) not to lose a non excludable monetary prize. Our protocol leads to public good provision (not deterioration) only if a certain contribution level is achieved. Since both frames differ with respect to the ref...
متن کاملCommitment and Participation in Public Goods Games
The Anh Han School of Computing, Teesside University, Borough Road, Middlesbrough, TS1 3BA, UK [email protected] Luís Moniz Pereira NOVA LINCS, Departamento de Informática, Faculdade de Ciências e Tecnologia, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, 2829-516 Caparica, Portugal [email protected] Tom Lenaerts MLG, Université Libre de Bruxelles, Boulevard du Triomphe CP212, 1050 Brussels, Belgium AI lab, Vrije Un...
متن کاملPublic Goods Games, Altruism, and Evolution
I analyze the evolution of altruistic preferences in a population where individuals are matched pairwise to play a one-shot public goods game. I determine the evolutionarily stable degree of altruism, allowing for assortative matching. The stable degree of altruism is strictly smaller than the degree of assortativity. In particular, if matching is completely random, spite is stable, and a posit...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
سال: 2019
ISSN: 0167-2681
DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2017.11.002