Public-good valuation and intra-family allocation

Private Valuation of a Public Good in Three Auction Mechanisms

We evaluate the impact of three auction mechanisms—the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (BDM) mechanism, the second-price auction (SPA), and the random nth-price auction (NPA)—in the measurement of private willingness-to-pay and willingness-to-accept for a pure public good. Our results show that the endowment effect is lower with the BDM mechanism. In this market mechanism, the effect disappears after a...

Public good and private good valuation for waiting time reduction: a laboratory study

In a laboratory experiment with salient rewards, subjects were endowed with money and waiting time. Preferences for waiting time were elicited both as a private good by means of a series of second price auctions, i.e., in a non-induced values framework, and as a public good in the scope of a voluntary contribution game. Our data supports the Lindahl equilibrium as a descriptive model of behavio...

Wick Experimental Studies on Public Good Allocation with Agents by

Private provision of a public good with time-allocation choice

When individuals with the same preferences but different gross wages and non-labor incomes allocate time to leisure and labor and contribute to a pure public good, the order of contributors' utilities is a perfect inversion of the order of their gross wages. The same applies to contributors' net and gross wages when contributions are financed by income from labor. There are consequences regardi...

Public-Good Productivity Differentials and Non-Cooperative Public-Good Provision

We explore the generality of Konrad and Lommerud (1995)’s Rotten Spouse Theorem. While the result holds for an arbitrary number of agents, it fails to hold for general technologies. We discuss some of the implications for CO2-emissions models.