Public good overprovision by a manipulative provider
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: The RAND Journal of Economics
سال: 2021
ISSN: 0741-6261,1756-2171
DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12370