Public good, collective action and financial regulation
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Collective Choice in Dynamic Public Good Provision ∗
Two heterogeneous agents contribute over time to a joint project, and collectively decide its scope. A larger scope requires greater cumulative effort and delivers higher benefits upon completion. We show that the efficient agent prefers a smaller scope, and preferences are time-inconsistent: as the project progresses, the efficient (inefficient) agent’s preferred scope shrinks (expands). We ch...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics
سال: 2020
ISSN: 1370-4788,1467-8292
DOI: 10.1111/apce.12308