Public Disclosure and Private Decisions: Equity Market Execution Quality and Order Routing
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Public Disclosure and Private Decisions: Equity Market Execution Quality and Order Routing
In 2001, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) required market centers to publish monthly execution-quality reports in an effort to spur competition for order flow between markets. Using samples of stocks trading on several markets, we investigate whether past execution quality affects order-routing decisions and whether the new disclosure requirements influence this relationship. We fin...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Review of Financial Studies
سال: 2006
ISSN: 0893-9454,1465-7368
DOI: 10.1093/rfs/hhl011