Public beliefs and corruption in a repeated psychological game
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Public beliefs and corruption in a repeated psychological game
This paper investigates the role of guilt aversion for corruption in public administration. Corruption is modeled as the outcome of a game played between a bureaucrat, a lobby, and the public. There is a moral cost of corruption for the bureaucrat, who is averse to letting the public down. We study how the behavior of the lobby and the bureaucrat depend on perceived public beliefs, when these a...
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Information and Beliefs in a Repeated Normal-Form Game We study beliefs and choices in a repeated normal-form game. In addition to a baseline treatment with common knowledge of the game structure and feedback about choices in the previous period, we run treatments (i) without feedback about previous play, (ii) with no information about the opponent’s payoffs and (iii) with random matching. Usin...
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This paper identifies gender beliefs in a public goods game and studies their impact on cooperation. On average, the beliefs of men, but not those of women, depend significantly on the group gender composition, with men expecting groups to be more cooperative when more females are present in the group. Gender beliefs of women are not absent, however, but show more variance than those of men. Th...
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For our experiment on corruption, we designed a coordination game to model the influence of risk attitudes, beliefs, and information on behavioral choices and determined the equilibria. We observed that the participants’ risk attitudes failed to explain their choices between corrupt and non-corrupt behavior. Instead, beliefs appeared to be a better predictor of whether or not they would opt for...
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We compare Colman's proposed "psychological game theory" with the existing literature on psychological games (Geanakoplos et ill. 1989), in which beliefs and intentions assume a prominent role. We also discuss experimental evidence on intentions, with a particular emphasis on reciprocal behavior, as well as recent efforts to show that such behavior is consistent with social evolution. Andrew Co...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
سال: 2011
ISSN: 0167-2681
DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2010.12.007