Prudent Rationalizability in Generalized Extensive-form Games with Unawareness
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Prudent Rationalizability in Generalized Extensive-Form Games∗
We define an extensive-form analogue of iterated admissibility, called Prudent Rationalizability (PR). In each round of the procedure, for each information set of a player a surviving strategy of hers is required to be rational vis-a-vis a belief system with a full-support belief on the opponents’ previously surviving strategies that reach that information set. Somewhat surprisingly, prudent ra...
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We construct a dynamic epistemic model for extensive form games, which generates a hierarchy of beliefs for each player over her opponents’ strategies and beliefs, and tells us how those beliefs will be revised as the game proceeds. We use the model to analyze the implications of the assumption that the players possess common (true) belief in rationality, thus extending the concept of rationali...
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We use an extensive form, universal type space to provide the following epistemic characterization of extensive form rationalizability. Say that player i strongly believes event E if i is certain of E conditional on each of her information sets consistent with E. Our main contribution is to show that a strategy profile s is extensive form rationalizable if and only if there is a state in which ...
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As proved by Shimoji and Watson, a strategy of an extensive-form game is rationalizable in the sense of Pearce if and only if it survives the maximal elimination of conditionally dominated strategies. Briefly, this is a process of iteratively eliminating conditionally dominated strategies according to a specific order. We prove, however, that there is nothing special about this order, and that ...
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We introduce a game in preference form, which consists of a game form and a preference structure, and define preference rationalizability that allows for each player’s ex-post preferences over outcomes to depend on opponents’ actions. We show that preference rationalizability is invariant to redundant types and states as long as all players have simplex restrictions on their ex-post preferences...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics
سال: 2020
ISSN: 1935-1704,2194-6124
DOI: 10.1515/bejte-2020-2013