Providing global public goods under uncertainty
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Discrete public goods under threshold uncertainty
A discrete public good is provided when total contributions exceed the contribution threshold, yet the threshold is often not known with certainty. I show that the relationship between the degree of threshold uncertainty and equilibrium contributions and welfare is not monotonic. For a large class of threshold probability distributions, equilibrium contributions will be higher under increased u...
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A discrete public good is provided when total contributions exceed the contribution threshold. I show that for a large class of threshold probability distributions, an increase in threshold uncertainty by 2nd-order stochastic dominance will increase (decrease) equilibrium contributions when the public good value is su ciently high (low). In an experiment designed to test these predictions, beha...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Public Economics
سال: 2010
ISSN: 0047-2727
DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2010.06.008