Protecting GNSS Open Service Navigation Message Authentication Against Distance-Decreasing Attacks

As the security of global navigation satellite systems (GNSSs) for civilian usage is increasingly important, message authentication (NMA) significantly improves resilience to spoofing attacks. However, not all attacks can be effectively countered: a strong variant replay/relay attacks, distance-decreasing (DD) shorten pseudorange measurements, without manipulating cryptographically protected message, thus position, velocity, and time solution undetected. First, we discuss how DD tamper with GNSS signals, demonstrating attack effectiveness on recorded Galileo signal. might introduce bit errors forged but adversary keep this error rate very low proper parameter settings. Then, based our mathematical model prompt correlator output tracking phase at victim receiver, find that distribution changes in presence This leads us apply hypothesis testing detect notably goodness-of-fit (GoF) test generalized likelihood ratio (GLRT), depending victim’s knowledge Monte Carlo simulations are used evaluate detection probability receiver operating characteristic curves two tests, different configuration noise GoF GLRT synthesized Both tests similar performance high-signal-to-noise-ratio (SNR) environments. The approximately 20% higher than low-SNR