Propositional or non-propositional attitudes?
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Propositional Attitudes? *
According to the standard lore on propositions, there are many propositional attitudes, including belief, fear, and desire. The standard lore is partly correct: belief is a propositional attitude. But, so this paper argues, fear and desire are never propositional attitudes, not even when the content of the relevant fear or desire can be fully expressed by using a that-clause. 1. What I Mean by ...
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This immediately raises the question what it is exactly that can be the object of an attitude; what kind of thing is the meaning of a sentence? Attitude reports give us a nice context in which to study this question and thus have a central importance for the semantics of natural language. However, the study of propositional attitudes mainly helps us to see what meanings are not. Unfortunately i...
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Suppose sentences (1a) and (1b) are true. What is the truth value of (1c) under the assignment that maps x to the individual d which is Cicero and Tully? As Quine observes, the ordinary notion of belief seems to require that although (1c) holds when x is specified in one way, namely as Cicero, it may yet fail when the same x is specified in some other way, namely as Tully. Classical modal predi...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Philosophical Studies
سال: 2013
ISSN: 0031-8116,1573-0883
DOI: 10.1007/s11098-013-0126-6