Propositional Intentionalism and the Argument from Appearance

The argument from appearance for the content view or intentionalism attracts a lot of attention recently. In my paper, I follow Charles Travis to argue against key premise that representational can be ‘read off’ certain way thing looks subject. My arguments are built upon Travis’s original objection and reinterpretation Rodrick Chisholm’s comparative noncomparative uses words. Byrne, Schellenberg others interpret Travis’ ‘visual looks’ as use, appeal use an alternative avoid objection. demonstrate they misunderstand both Chisholm Travis. Both semantic notions, while is metaphysical one. Although objectivism –– expressions attribute appearances ordinary objects close looks’, not exceptional Byrne interprets. end, also show Byrnean’s conception distinctive visual gestalt cannot exclude contrary contents, because shared by different kinds things. Besides, do explain why should presented ‘being instantiated’. Therefore, conclude read off subject; thus fails.