منابع مشابه
Multi-Attribute Proportional Representation
We consider the following problem in which a given number of items has to be chosen from a predefined set. Each item is described by a vector of attributes and for each attribute there is a desired distribution that the selected set should have. We look for a set that fits as much as possible the desired distributions on all attributes. Examples of applications include choosing members of a rep...
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The goal of multi-winner elections is to choose a fixed-size committee based on voters’ preferences. An important concern in this setting is representation: large groups of voters with cohesive preferences should be adequately represented by the election winners. Recently, Aziz et al. (2015a; 2017) proposed two axioms that aim to capture this idea: justified representation (JR) and its strength...
متن کاملStructured Proportional Representation
Multi-winner voting rules aiming at proportional representation, such as those suggested by Chamberlin and Courant [9] and by Monroe [20], partition an electorate into virtual districts, such that a representative is assigned to each district; these districts are formed based on the voters’ preferences. In some applications it is beneficial to require certain structural properties to be satisfi...
متن کاملProportional Representation in Vote Streams
We consider elections where the voters come one at a time, in a streaming fashion, and devise space-efficient algorithms which identify an approximate winning committee with respect to common multiwinner proportional representation voting rules; specifically, we consider the Approval-based and the Borda-based variants of both the Chamberlin– Courant rule and the Monroe rule. We complement our a...
متن کاملProportional Representation and Strategic Voters
The goal of this paper is to examine the incentives to vote insincerely, other than those induced by rounding, faced by voters under proportional representation. We investigate two models of voters. We show that ‘seat maximisers can have an incentive to manipulate only if a threshold is present. We show that ‘power maximisers can have an incentive to manipulate both in the presence and in the a...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Political Science Quarterly
سال: 1912
ISSN: 0032-3195
DOI: 10.2307/2141115