Property Rights, Village Political System, and Forestry Investment: Evidence from China’s Collective Forest Tenure Reform
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Property Rights and Investment Incentives: Theory and Evidence from Ghana
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We consider a dynamic model of an economy where productive capital can be owned only by the members of an elite oligarchy, because property rights and contracts are effectively enforced only by their private political networks. This private protection entails a degree of ownership security that is good but not perfect. We find that the performance of the economy will depend critically on oligar...
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Adelaide to strengthen teaching and research in the field of international economics and closely related disciplines. Its specific objectives are: • to promote individual and group research by scholars within and outside the University of Adelaide • to strengthen undergraduate and postgraduate education in this field • to provide shorter training programs in Australia and elsewhere • to conduct...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Forests
سال: 2018
ISSN: 1999-4907
DOI: 10.3390/f9090541